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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Douglas Arthur Liles timely appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation. On appeal, Mr. Liles argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due
process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with a transcript of
the June 17,2011, jurisdictional review hearing Mr. Liles requested to be created at the
public's expense. Mr. Liles also argues that the district court abused its discretion when
it revoked probation and failed to further reduce the length of his sentence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Liles was charged, by Information, with driving under the influence of alcohol

(hereinafter, DUI) and a felony enhancement.

(R., pp.25-26.)

Pursuant to a plea

agreement Mr. Liles pleaded guilty to a felony DUI and, in return, the State agreed to
recommend probation. (11/12/10 Tr., p.1, Ls.15-24; R., pp.30-31, 44.) Thereafter, the
district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with two years fixed, but retained
jurisdiction. (R., pp.44-46.) Upon review of Mr. Liles' period of retained jurisdiction, the
district court suspended the sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.52-57.)
After a period of probation, the State filed a motion for probation violation alleging
that Mr. Liles violated various terms of his probation. (R., pp.72-74.) Mr. Liles admitted
to violating the terms of his probation by consuming alcohol, becoming involved in
unauthorized romantic relationships, and driving while his driver's license was
suspended. (R., pp.72-75; 12/02/11 Tr., p.3, Ls.8-9, p.8, L.9 - p.11, L.7.) The district
court then revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence, but reduced the
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sentence to eight years, with two years fixed. (R., pp.82-85.) Mr. Liles timely appealed.
(R., pp.87-89.)
On appeal, Mr. Liles' appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the record with
transcripts of the December 2, 2012, probation admit/deny hearing and the June 17,
2011, rider review hearing. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule
and Statement in Support Thereof (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-5.) The State
objected in part to Mr. Liles' request for the transcript of the June 17,2011, rider review
hearing.

(Objection in Part to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing

Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof' (hereinafter, Objection to Motion to
Augment), pp.1-4.)

Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order granting

Mr. Liles' request for the December 2, 2012, probation admit/deny hearing and denying
Mr. Liles' request for the June 17, 2011, rider review hearing. (Order to Augment the
Record (In Part) and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule.
Motion to Augment), pp.1-2.)
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(hereinafter, Order Denying

ISSUES
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Liles due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcript?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Liles' probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to further reduce Mr. Liles'
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Liles Due Process And Equal Protection When It
Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The Necessary Transcript

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to
the issues raised on appeal.
In this case, Mr. Liles filed a Motion to Augment, requesting a transcript of the
June 17, 2011, rider review hearing. That request was denied by the Supreme Court.
On appeal, Mr. Liles is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for
the transcript. Mr. Liles asserts that the requested transcript is relevant to the issues of
whether the district court abused its discretion in revoking probation and abused its
discretion by failing to further reduce the length of his sentence because the district
court stated on the record that it reviewed its notes of the June 17, 2011, rider review
hearing prior to the probation violation disposition hearing, from which this appeal was
filed. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in denying his request.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Liles Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With The
Necessary Transcript

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Liles With
Access To The Requested Transcript, Has Denied Him Due Process And
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate
Review Of His Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; IDAHO. CONST.
art.I§13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servo of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State

V.

Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State

132 Idaho 88 (1998)).

V.

Wood,

The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States

Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh

V.

State, Oept. of

Health and Welfare ex rei. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2

mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
5

"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Oryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record,

including a stenographic transcript of the

proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
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themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[pJroviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court.'" Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
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In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In Draper v. State, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be
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adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal.

Id. at 195. If the State

wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App.
2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or face procedural default.

"It is well established that an appellant

bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416,
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review."

State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Liles fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested item, the legal presumption will apply and
Mr. Liles' claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action alone,
which prevents him from access to the requested item, then such action is a violation of
due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer apply.
Whether the transcript of the requested proceeding was before the district court
at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the
transcript is relevant to the issues on appeal because in reaching a sentencing decision,
a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing
from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained
from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 37374 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,907 (1983) (recognizing that
the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard
during the trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could
rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has
observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein
involved");

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing

court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously
dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he
already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearings
10

were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon the information it
already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the decision to
revoke probation. In this case, the district court stated on the record that it reviewed its
own original sentencing notes and "the sentencing notes at the time of the rider
review."1 (12/30/11 Tr., p.2, Ls.20-24.) The district court went on to state as follows:
And the Court considered all of that together with the other
presentence materials, determined that a period of incarceration had been
earned, and the Court retained jurisdiction.
You went off this CAPP Rider Program. And initially you didn't do
very well, but your attitude improved and your performance improved, and
the department recommended that I place you on probation.
(12/30/11 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.2.) The district court relied on its notes of the June 17,
2011, rider review hearing and then summarized Mr. Liles' performance while on his
rider as part of its rationale underlying the ruling, from which this appeal was filed.
Therefore, the requested item is relevant to the issues on appeal because the district
court directly relied on its notes from the June 17, 2011 rider review hearing when it
issued the order which is currently on appeal.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan,
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012) (not yet fina!), which addressed
the foregoing argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on
probation. Id. at 1.

After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the

terms of his probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction.
Id. at 1-2.

After completing the rider, the district court placed the defendant on

probation. Id. at 2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and

This fact was not addressed in the Motion to Augment and, therefore, was not before
the Idaho Supreme Court when it denied Mr. Liles request for the transcript of the
June 17, 2011, rider review hearing.
1
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the district court revoked probation.

The defendant appealed from the district

Id.

court's second order revoking probation. Id.
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4.
While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, at this point
this case is not final. As stated above, the district court relied on its own notes of the
hearing at issue when it decided to revoke probation.

(12/30/11 Tr., p.2, Ls.20-24.)

Moreover, this case is distinguishable from Morgan because Mr. Liles is challenging not
only the order revoking probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails an
analysis of the district court's sentencing rationale.
Additionally, the requested item is within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. The requested transcript is relevant because Idaho appellate courts review all
proceedings following

sentencing

when

appropriate sentencing determinations.

determining

whether the

court

made

See State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26,

28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that is ordered into execution following
a period of probation, we will examine the entire record encompassing events before
12

and after the original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original sentencing and
the revocation of probation." (emphasis added)).2
Further support for Mr. Liles' position can be found in State v. Warren, 123 Idaho
20 (Ct. App.1992).

In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated battery in

1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and
the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the period of
retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, which was
ultimately revoked.

Id.

The district court then sua sponte reduced the length of

Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district court
should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that position,
Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial.

Id. The Court of Appeals

addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the

2 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in
Hanington. Specifically it held:
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a/l
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeaL"
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is not a final opinion and
Mr. Liles is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal.
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nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his
sentence reduction claim because he failed to provide the original PSI and a transcript
of the original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though the original sentence was not on
appeal, and happened years before the decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals
held that the transcript was necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error.
Moreover, there was no indication that a transcript of that hearing was created before
the probation violation hearing or that the district court referenced the original
sentencing hearing at the probation violation disposition hearing.

It appears that the

Court of Appeals assumed that the original sentencing hearing would address the
nature of the original offense. Had Mr. Liles failed to request the transcript at issue, the
Warren opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's

decision to execute the original sentence.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The decision to deny Mr. Liles' request for the transcript will
render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcript
supports the district court's sentencing decisions. This functions as a procedural bar to
the review of Mr. Liles' appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and therefore,
Mr. Liles should either be provided with the requested transcript or the presumption
should not be applied.

14

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Liles With Access To
The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process Because He
Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[toJ hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard.'" Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Doug/as was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United States Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Doug/as that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
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The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements

of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcript prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any
argument made or undercutting an argument.

Therefore, Mr. Liles has not obtained

review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with effective
assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the Idaho Supreme Court held

that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal
Justice, The Defense Function.

These standards offer insight into the role and

responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . .. Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
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Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcript, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation.

Further, counsel is unable to advise Mr. Liles on the

probable role the transcript may play in the appeal.
Mr. Liles is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and effective
assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant transcript.
Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Liles his constitutional right to due
process which includes a right to the effective assistance of counsel in this appeal.
Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access to the requested
transcript and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental
briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Liles' Probation
Mr. Liles asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its
discretion when it revoked his probation.

When a defendant appeals from an order

revoking probation the Idaho Court of Appeals has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct. App. 1987).
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989).

Mr. Liles concedes that he violated the terms of his probation. Accordingly, he
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation.

"A district court's

decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the
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court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). "When a
district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and
consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923
(Ct. App. 2003).

"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate

response to a violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal
of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001).
Mr. Liles has collegiate aspirations and support from the Veterans Administration.
Mr. Liles' counsel made the following comments at the probation violation disposition
hearing:
He completed successfully the CAPP Rider Program. As he sits here
before you today, he appears to be an inmate worker. He's dressed in
white, seems to be doing well in custody. He advises me he's a student at
Boise State, is still enrolled in school and has housing he is about to lose.
He would very much like to be placed back on probation. I think
he understands the gravity of the violations to which he admitted and
understands that he [cannot] be involved in some of those relationships.
(12/30/11 Tr., p.4, L.25 - p.5, L.10.) Mr. Liles also told the district court that he had
developed a new respect for its orders.

(12/30/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-9.)

Mr. Liles also

informed the district court that he was granted a service dog from the Veterans
Administration and was participating in domestic violence and mental health treatment
at the Veterans Administration. (12/20/11 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-14.) While Mr. Liles did not
perform well on probation, he does have support from the Veterans Administration and
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aspires to complete college which is enough incentive to prevent Mr. Liles from violating
his probation in the future.
In, sum, the district court abused its discretion when it revoked probation
because Mr. Liles had enough support and an incentive to refrain from violating his
probation in the future.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Further Reduce Mr. Liles'
Sentence Sua Sponte Upon Revoking Probation
Mr. Liles asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight
years, with two years fixed, is excessive.

Due to the district court's power under

I.C.R. 35 to reduce the length of the original sentence sua sponte upon the
relinquishment of jurisdiction, on appeal an appellant can challenge the length of the
sentence as being excessive. State v. McCarthy, 145 Idaho 397, 400 (Ct. App. 2008).
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.'"

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573,577 (1979». Mr. Liles does not allege that his
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of

discretion, Mr. Liles must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria, or objectives of
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criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and
the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution
for wrongdoing. Id.
As a preliminary matter, Mr. Liles incorporates the arguments made in section",
supra.

There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the
conclusion that Mr. Liles' sentence is excessively harsh. Specifically, Mr. Liles' lifetime
of victimization is a mitigating factor. Mr. Liles was raised in a strict military household,
and was verbally, emotionally, and physically abused by his father.

(Presentence

Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.9.) He said his father had a sadistic love to
beat people. (PSI, p.13.) On one occasion, Mr. Liles remembers passing out because
his father was choking him. (PSI, p.48.)
Mr. Liles was also exposed to severe sexual abuse as an adult.

Mr. Liles

enlisted in the military in 1979 and was honorably discharged. (PSI, p.11.) However,
while in the military he was repeatedly "raped by other soldiers." (PSI, p.11.) Mr. Liles
reported the sexual abuse to his supervising officers, but they ignored him. (PSI, p.11.)
Mr. Liles' suffers from post traumatic stress disorder which was caused by the sexual
abuse he was exposed to in the military. (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Liles is afraid of being around
groups of males and is paranoid when people stand behind him. (PSI, p.48.) "He will
pay attention to hearing cars outside his home and sometimes counts how many people
are in the car and how many [car doors] slam to evaluate where people are and what
they might be doing." (PSI, p.48.) Due to the foregoing experiences, Mr. Liles scored in
the high range of the Generalized Victimization Scale. (PSI, p.64.)
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There is a causal relationship between Mr. Liles' victimization and his criminal
behavior. Mr. Liles' criminal history began after he was discharged from the military.
(PSI, p.16.) Mr. Liles told the presentence investigator that his criminal behavior was a
means to rebel against authority "since he was angry that no one had helped him when
he was victimized." (PSI, p.8.) There is a possibility that Mr. Liles' developed a mistrust
for authority figures because both his father and his supervising officers failed to protect
him and actually either caused or enabled further abuse.

This could have also

contributed to his criminal behaviors.
Additionally, Mr. Liles' mental health issues are mitigating factors.

Mr. Liles

suffers from anxiety and PTSD. (R., p.34.) Mr. Liles must have realized that he had
some mental health problems because he was in the process of getting mental health
evaluations before he committed the instant offense. (PSI, pp.2-3, 12.) It is important
to note that Mr. Liles did recognize he had mental health issues, the same issues linked
to his criminal behavior, and was voluntarily seeking treatment prior to the commission
of the instant offense.
Additionally, Mr. Liles' substance addiction is a mitigating factor. Mr. Liles was
diagnosed as being dependent on alcohol, but received a recommendation for intensive
outpatient treatment. (PSI, pp.55, 66.) Mr. Liles was drinking on the night of the instant
offense as a means to cope with a stressful divorce and the fact his former spouse stole
over eight thousand dollars from him. (PSI, p.49.)
Additionally, Mr. Liles' collegiate aspirations are mitigating factors.
completed high school and two years of college.

(R., p.34.)

Mr. Liles

Prior to sentencing,

Mr. Liles was attending Boise State University with the goal of earning a Bachelor
Degree in social work.

(01/21/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-19.) He also has plans to earn a
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master's degree from Oral Roberts University in Oklahoma so he can be a social worker
with a faith based emphasis. (01/21/11 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-18, p.34, Ls.12-19; PSI, p.11.)
His trial counsel stated the Mr. Liles "seems like a bright guy, he's certainly capable of
the plans that he's made."

(01/21/11 Tr., p.31, Ls.13-15.)

In the event Mr. Liles

accomplishes this goal he will have a strong incentive to control both his addiction and
criminal behavior.
Further, Mr. Liles' employment background and financial support from the
Veterans' Administration are mitigating factors.

While Mr. Liles does have many

occupationally based skills, he has difficulty mainting employment due to his mental
health issues. (PSI, p.12.) At the time of sentencing, he was receiving disability checks
from the government and characterized himself as being fifty percent disabled. (PSI,
p.12.) However, he did maintain one job for ten to fifteen years as an electrician. (PSI,
p.49.) Mr. Liles also receives benefits through the Veterans Administration.
Finally, Mr. Liles did express remorse and accepted responsibility.

At

sentencing, Mr. Liles expressed his remorse and accepted the fact that his actions
posed a risk to society. (01/21/11 Tr., p.34, Ls.12-13, p.38, Ls.1-7.) Mr. Liles said that
he was ashamed of his behavior. (PSI, p.3.)
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that
Mr. Liles' sentence is excessively harsh.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Liles respectfully
requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction to place him on probation.
Alternatively, Mr. Liles respectfully requests that this Court reduce the length of the
indeterminate portion of his sentence. Alternatively, Mr. Liles respectfully requests that
this Court reduce the length of his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2012.
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SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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